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THE NUREMBERG TRIAL,  
SEVENTY YEARS LATER 
LEILA NADYA SADAT

 
Seventy years ago, my fellow countryman, Justice Robert H. Jackson 
stood in this courtroom and gave the opening statement for the Prosecution 
at the trial of the major German defendants before the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. According to Telford Taylor, a member 
of his team, Jackson had been nervous and irritable for weeks prior to the 
opening of the trial, which had almost been delayed, over his objections, 
several times. But once he walked to the podium and began to speak, his 
voice was clear, and his commitment was unshakeable—no one listening 
that day or reading his statement afterwards could doubt his passion, 
eloquence and firm conviction that his role was to bring the rule of law to 
bear on the question of what to do with the twenty-two captured Germans 
in the dock that day. Jackson understood that this was no ordinary trial and 
knew that the world was watching and would judge him harshly if he 
failed. He did not. Jackson, like the other prosecutors that presented 
evidence to the Tribunal over the next ten months, rose to the occasion. 
His Opening Statement, in particular, and its impact over the decades, has 
been forever etched in the hearts and minds of scholars, activists and 
students of Nuremberg. 
Jackson noted that he had the “privilege” to open the first trial in 
history for crimes against the peace of the world, a privilege that imposed 
upon him a grave responsibility. Ladies and gentlemen, your Excellencies, 
distinguished academics and dear friends and colleagues, I feel similarly 
privileged to stand before you today at the opening of this important 
meeting of the International Nuremberg Principles Academy—on the 
occasion of the 70th anniversary of that famous trial—and address you 
regarding a subject that has been close to my heart and academic work for 
the better part of two decades. While these remarks are in no way as 
consequential as Jackson’s Opening Statement was seventy years ago, I 
 
 
  James Carr Professor of International Criminal Law and Director, Whitney R. Harris World 
Law Institute, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis; Special Adviser on Crimes Against 
Humanity to the ICC Prosecutor. This Essay originated as a Keynote Address delivered on November 
20, 2015 at the International Nuremberg Principles Academy Conference on “The Nuremberg 
Principles 70 Years Later: Contemporary Challenges” held in Nuremberg, Germany. This Essay 
represents the personal views of the author and does not represent the official views of any organ of 
the International Criminal Court. 
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feel a similar responsibility. What is there to be said about an event and its 
consequences that has not already been the subject of distinguished books, 
films, articles and conferences? What can I, as an American observer and 
commentator, bring to your important discussions today on the Nuremberg 
legacy?  
Having been charged with the task, I, too, hope to rise to the occasion. I 
will address only briefly the Nuremberg trials themselves, and then 
quickly turn to their legacy—how the extraordinary events of 1945 and 
1946 have shaped the world since that time. I would then like to turn our 
attention to aspects of the Nuremberg legacy that remain either unfinished 
or have tarnished, rather than brightened, with the passage of time, and 
conclude with some final reflections on what can be done to reinforce the 
legacy so that we do not find ourselves, seventy years hence, “breathless 
and ashamed” as they were in 1945,1 at the devastation wrought by a 
world at war, but enjoying the benefits and prosperity that have resulted 
from our efforts to promote the gradual and unceasing construction of a 
world at peace.  
I. THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 
The difficulties that Jackson faced in 1945 remain with us, to some 
extent, today. Indeed, rereading the biographies from that period,
2
 I am 
struck by how many of the same problems have been present at the ad hoc 
tribunals and the International Criminal Court. Plus ça change, plus ça 
reste pareil. Jackson, of course, was keenly aware of the deficiencies, both 
legal and practical, that faced the prosecution team at Nuremberg. A 
country lawyer without formal legal training, he had risen to the highest 
judicial office in the United States as a result of his keen mind and 
extraordinary rhetorical skill.
3
 He knew that the case was a novel one, that 
the precedent for indicting and trying the accused was virtually non-
existent, and that there were legitimacy questions raised by the specter of 
having German accused tried to a bench of Allied jurists by a team of 
Allied prosecutors. Rather than hide from the weaknesses of his case, 
however, he met them head on. 
 
 
 1. WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1908) (describing the first quarter century of the nineteenth century). 
 2. See, e.g., WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL (2d ed. 1999); FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON, 
LE PROCÈS DE NUREMBERG: SON IMPORTANCE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE (1946); HARTLEY 
SHAWCROSS, LIFE SENTENCE: THE MEMOIRS OF LORD SHAWCROSS (1995); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE 
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1st ed. 1992). 
 3. GAIL JARROW, ROBERT H. JACKSON 42, 57–58 (2008).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/9
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As Jackson observed in his Opening Statement, the case was complex, 
involving “the developments of a decade, covering a whole continent, and 
involving a score of nations, countless individuals, and innumerable 
events.”4 Eight months earlier, the courtroom had been an enemy fortress 
and the accused and the documents were in enemy hands. There was no 
codification of the relevant law, no procedures had been established, no 
tribunal was in existence, and no prosecuting staff had been assembled. 
Further, nearly all the accused were at large and the four prosecuting 
powers had not yet joined in common cause to try them. What Jackson did 
not reveal publicly was that the four prosecutorial teams did not work well 
together. It was an arduous and difficult diplomatic, as well as legal, 
process. The negotiators and prosecutors wrangled over the differences 
between common law and civil law procedure and struggled with 
questions of substantive law and procedure: with the Anglo-American 
concept of conspiracy; with the impossibility of getting documents 
translated in time for all the judges and defense counsel to receive copies; 
with the particularity requirement of the indictment. Jackson had trouble 
with his staff, many of whom departed either due to conflict with him or 
for personal reasons. Telford Taylor described the staff as being plagued 
by tensions and petty jealousies, living in an expatriate bubble, with little 
interaction between occupiers and occupied.
5
 The Russians were not 
permitted to fraternize with the other teams,
6
 and although François de 
Menthon opened the French case with a stirring and oft-quoted statement, 
he returned to France shortly thereafter, leaving Champetier de Ribes in 
charge for the remainder of the trial.
7
 Finally, many of Jackson’s 
American compatriots were scornful about the utility and enforceability of 
international law, arguing that the trials would either make matters worse 
or, at best, be a useless act.  
The international political environment was challenging for the 
Tribunal as well. Just two days prior to the signing of the London 
Agreement and Charter, the Enola Gay was winging its way through the 
sky en route to dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and one day after 
 
 
 4. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
14 November 1945—1 October 1946, vol. II, Opening Statement for the United States of America by 
Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, 100 (Nov. 21, 1945) [hereinafter Jackson, 
Opening Statement], available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-II.pdf.  
 5. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 232.  
 6. Id. at 209. 
 7. Id. at 212, 294–95. 
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the Charter was signed, a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki,
8
 killing 
tens of thousands of civilians. Because the four Allied powers had a vested 
interest in not pursuing charges that would show them in a bad light, they 
had not included any charges relating to aerial bombardment,
9
 and the 
Russians insisted on accusing the Germans of the Katyn Forest massacre 
(which had actually been perpetrated by Russian forces).
10
 The press 
covered the trials, but found the documentary evidence boring.
11
 Jackson 
bemoaned the fact that no real arrangements had been made so Germans 
could attend and learn about the trial.
12
 On March 5, 1946, as the Russians 
were presenting their evidence at Nuremberg, Winston Churchill was in 
Fulton, Missouri giving his famous Iron Curtain Speech ushering in the 
Cold War era.
13
  
Jackson understood these difficult political realities, but he defended 
the trials, writing later “[w]hat we should have done with these men is a 
question always evaded by those who find fault with what we did do.”14 
He and Roosevelt shared the view that the thirst for vengeance, which had 
been amply demonstrated in the French purge of thousands of former 
collaborators, could, if applied to the Germans, lead to doubt about and 
denial of the crimes and a myth of martyrdom. Instead, they argued, there 
must be public proof of Nazi crimes, and the accused must be given the 
chance to defend themselves.
15
  
After ten months of proceedings, the trial was over and the judges 
retired to deliberate. The judgment they rendered on October 1, 1946 was 
impressive.
16
 Indeed, many of its pronouncements form part of the modern 
canon of international law: that crimes are “committed by men, not by 
abstract entities”;17 that the law of the Charter was both an “expression of 
international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is 
itself a contribution to international law”;18 that the establishment of the 
 
 
 8. Id. at 74; Luc Reydams & Jan Wouters, The Politics of Establishing International Criminal 
Tribunals in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 6, 13 (Luc Reydams et al eds., 2012).  
 9. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 325–26. 
 10. Id. at 117; HARRIS, supra note 2, at 31–32, 252. 
 11. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 197. 
 12. Id. at 235. 
 13. Id. at 316–17. 
 14. Robert H. Jackson, Introduction, in HARRIS, supra note 2, at XXXI.  
 15. Id. at XXXIV (discussing Roosevelt’s support of a “speedy but fair trial”); TAYLOR, supra 
note 2, at 44–45 (discussing Justice Jackson’s opposition to show trials). 
 16. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
vol. I, Judgment (Oct. 1, 1946), available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 223.  
 18. Id. at 218. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/9
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International Military Tribunal by the Allied powers was lawful because 
they had only “done together what any one of them might have done 
singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up 
special courts to administer law.”19  
In terms of substantive law, the International Military Tribunal 
articulated its understanding of the law it was asked to apply, famously 
holding:  
War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to 
the belligerent States alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a 
war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is 
the supreme international crime differing only from other war 
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole.
20
  
Although this statement arguably conflates war crimes and crimes against 
peace, its essence—a juridical condemnation of the evils of war—is 
undeniably powerful. In other respects, the judgment was perhaps less 
progressive, particularly regarding the crimes against humanity counts, 
which were limited to acts committed against civilians after the onset of 
the war, in spite of language to the contrary in the Charter.
21
  
Yet even with these arguable deficiencies, seventy years later we still 
study, discuss, and even revere the Nuremberg trial.
22
 For separated from 
its all too human flaws, the decision to hold a trial, and the 
accomplishment of the task to a high level of professionalism and 
distinction, represented an extraordinary achievement. It may have been an 
American “show”23 in terms of the material support and size of the various 
participating prosecutorial teams; but it built upon decades of European 
thought which, following the failed experience of the Leipzig trials held 
after World War I, endeavored to fortify the emerging structure of 
international criminal law.
24
  
Building upon this legacy, Nuremberg taught us to re-conceptualize the 
notion of war and its worst consequences, as well as to reframe our 
 
 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 186. 
 21. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of 
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 308–09 
(1994) (formerly Wexler). 
 22. A search of the major legal databases reveals that well over two hundred journal and law 
review articles have discussed the topic in the past three years alone. 
 23. ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS 233 (2005). 
 24. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg Paradox, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 151, 159–60 (2010). 
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response to it. But the question remained whether Nuremberg would 
simply be a “one off” historic event, or whether it would have enduring 
salience in the post-war era. It is to this question I now turn. 
II. THE NUREMBERG LEGACY IN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW 
The decision to hold war crimes trials was made contemporaneously 
with the San Francisco Conference establishing the United Nations. The 
principles of Nuremberg are thus deeply intertwined “with the 
organization of the United Nations as the twin foundations of an 
international society ordered by law.”25 We see this in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter prohibiting the use of force against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of Member States,
26
 and in the limited exceptions 
to that prohibition enshrined in Article 51 (on self-defense) and the powers 
of the Security Council under Chapter VII.
27
  
Likewise, the Charter incorporates provisions—albeit limited ones—on 
the importance of human rights.
28
 Indeed, modern human rights law—like 
modern international criminal law—rests upon the Nuremberg foundation. 
The corollary of the notion that individuals have duties under international 
law is that they may also acquire rights thereunder.  
The Nuremberg principles were prepared by the International Law 
Commission and presented to the General Assembly after the war,
29
 and at 
least some of the “law” enshrined in the Charter and judgment found its 
way into new international instruments on apartheid, genocide, the laws of 
war, and torture,
30
 although aggression and crimes against humanity were 
 
 
 25. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 42 (quoting Justice Jackson’s son, William E. Jackson). 
 26. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 27. Id. art. 51. 
 28. Id. arts. 55 & 56; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
 29. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its First Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/13, at 279 
(1949). 
 30. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940 129 Consol. T.S. 361; Hague Convention 
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 
Bevans 631; Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3144 , 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/9
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never the subject of specialized conventions. Understood broadly, the 
“Nuremberg principles” eschew collective responsibility in favor of 
individual criminal responsibility; provide that no human being (even a 
head of state or other responsible government official) is above the law 
with respect to the most serious crimes of concern to humanity as a whole: 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggressive war; and 
that reliance upon internal law is no defense to crime for which an 
individual may have responsibility under international law.
31
  
Thus at the international level, the Nuremberg principles became an 
essential part of the new world order. But their implementation soon ran 
aground on the shoals of state politics. The permanent members of the 
Security Council were often divided, which meant that the International 
Law Commission’s work preparing a draft code of crimes and a statute for 
an international criminal court were largely unsuccessful.
32
 The 
Nuremberg principles were also often honored in the breach. The United 
States invaded Vietnam; the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Neither 
state’s government appeared to understand—or perhaps to care—that the 
Nuremberg principles applied to these wars.
33
  
It was only in the 1990s, as war broke out in the former Yugoslavia and 
the Rwandan genocide sickened and shocked the world, that the 
international community, freed from Cold War politics, reached for the 
Nuremberg precedent, and established, for the first time since 1945, new 
international criminal tribunals. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals 
had similar, but not identical jurisdictions to their forbearer, though neither 
Tribunal included crimes against peace in its statute.
34
 Although both 
Tribunals suffered the same human difficulties experienced at Nuremberg, 
both were ultimately able to establish themselves as credible and 
 
 
U.N.T.S. 287; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 31. Leila Nadya Sadat, Shattering the Nuremberg Consensus: U.S. Rendition Policy and 
International Law, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 65, 66 (2008). 
 32. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 665, 667 (1996) (formerly Wexler). 
 33. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 636 (outlining the U.S. position on both invasions and their 
relation to the Nuremberg principles); Jean Allain, The Continued Evolution of International 
Adjudication, in LOOKING AHEAD: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 50, 55 (Can. Council 
of Int’l Law ed., 2012) (discussing popular opposition to the conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan 
based on the Nuremberg Principles); Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Principles and the Gulf 
War, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 711, 719–20 (1992) (discussing the willingness of heads of state to ignore 
the Nuremberg Principles). 
 34. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 6, 1994). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
582 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:575 
 
 
 
 
successful international institutions, trying scores of defendants and 
creating important precedents which have added depth to our conceptual 
and practical understanding of international criminal justice and the 
substantive law of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as 
well as international criminal procedure.
35
 Building upon this foundation, 
in 1998, a statute for a permanent International Criminal Court was 
adopted after years of difficult negotiations. The International Criminal 
Court now has 124 States Parties, and the substantive law of the Court is 
widely cited by national and international courts and tribunals, even 
including, interestingly, the courts of non-States Parties, like the United 
States.
36
 
Returning to the question of Nuremberg’s impact on national 
jurisdictions, prior to the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
in 1998, the Nuremberg principles were, to paraphrase the great French 
jurist Claude Lombois, “like a volcano” that was dormant, but not 
extinct.
37
 And indeed, after the post-war trials, of which there were 
thousands all over the world—in France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, 
Poland, and the Soviet Union—Nuremberg and its teachings seemed to be 
forgotten as nations recovered from the pain and suffering of the war. That 
changed in 1961 when Israel abducted Adolf Eichmann from Argentina 
and charged him with crimes under Israeli law, including crimes against 
humanity. His trial was widely covered by the press, and many credit the 
Eichmann trial with forcing Germany to confront its Nazi past as it did in 
the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials, held from 1963–1965.38 Likewise, in the 
 
 
 35. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has indicted 161 persons of 
whom 81 have been convicted (with an additional eight cases currently on appeal): Key Figures of the 
Cases, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/sid/24 (last 
updated May 23, 2016). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has indicted 93 individuals 
with 59 convictions: Key Figures of the Cases, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last visited May 26, 2016); see also Leila Nadya 
Sadat, The Contribution of the ICTR to the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFRICA 118 (Charles Chernor 
Jalloh & Alhagi B. M. Marong eds., 2015); Yaël Ronen, The Impact of the ICTY on Atrocity-Related 
Prosecutions in the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 113 (2014) 
(discussing the importance of ICTY jurisprudence in the national courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 36. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kaing, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement (July 26, 
2010) (Cambodia) (drawing repeatedly on the ICC Statute and Elements of the Crimes in finding Duch 
guilty of crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement (May 
18, 2012) (Sierra Leone) (also relying on the ICC Statute and Elements of the Crimes in its conviction 
of Taylor); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that a 
Massachusetts minister, by aiding and abetting the persecution of LGBTI individuals in Uganda, had 
committed a crime against humanity). 
 37. Sadat, supra note 21, at 313 n.93.  
 38. Lecture, Henrike Claussen, International Humanitarian Law Dialogs, Chautauqua, Aug. 31, 
2015 (author’s notes). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/9
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1970s and 1980s, France began the process of bringing French and 
German World War II defendants to trial using the Nuremberg Charter as 
incorporated into French law in the cases brought against Klaus Barbie 
and Paul Touvier. Although Barbie, like Eichmann, was a case in which a 
state was more comfortable proceeding because the accused was not of the 
same nationality as the victim, the Touvier case, begun in 1973 and 
ultimately decided in the 1990s, involved a French WWII collaborator 
who was indicted and convicted of crimes against humanity for acts 
carried out against French victims.
39
 The Priebke case brought by Italy in 
1997
40
 and the Finta case brought by Canada in 1994
41
 were also related to 
the war.  
In Latin America, many prosecutions and truth commissions have been 
undertaken in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, 
relating to crimes committed not during World War II but by former 
officials of those countries, especially during the “Dirty War” in the 
1970s. The Pinochet case is perhaps the most famous example arising out 
of the Latin American experience. The case involved not only the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture in European states in 
which the cases were brought, but ultimately prosecutions in the Chilean 
courts themselves.
42
 More recently Guatemala’s Attorney General brought 
a case against President Rios Montt for genocide against the Mayan 
people.
43
  
The Nuremberg principles have also found their way into international 
human rights law. Both the European and Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights (and the Inter-American Commission) have developed a 
broad jurisprudence on many international crimes, both in terms of 
elements, modalities, and potential amnesties for such crimes. This case 
 
 
 39. Sadat, supra note 21, at 316–17, 330, 333. 
 40. Rome Military Tribunal, Hass and Priebke, Judgment of July 22, 1997.  
 41. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.). 
 42. R. v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte 
Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); Sebastian Brett, The Pinochet 
Prosecution, Human Rights Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/ 
dispatches.html (last visited May 27, 2016). 
 43. Efraín Ríos Montt & Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez, International Justice Monitor, available at 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/efrain-rios-montt-and-mauricio-rodriguez-sanchez-background/ (last visited 
May 27, 2016). The Open Society Foundation has English translations of portions of Montt’s 
conviction by the First Criminal Court of First Instance for Criminal Justice, Drug Trafficking and 
Environmental Crimes and its subsequent reversal by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court available 
online, available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/rios-montt-judgment-
full-version-11072013_2.pdf and https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/rios-
montt-consitutional-court-judgment-plus-dissents-11072013.pdf respectively. A new trial began in 
January of 2015. 
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law has become so extensive that my colleague Alexandra Huneeus refers 
to them as “quasi-criminal jurisdictions” that are in fact enforcing 
international criminal law.
44
  
In Africa, the Hissène Habré trial, which followed Belgium v. Senegal 
and the International Court of Justice’s decision that Senegal had an 
obligation to either try or extradite Habré under the Torture Convention, 
has set an important precedent.
45
 Likewise, the establishment of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone as a mixed jurisdiction has “domesticated” 
the Nuremberg principles,
46
 as has the widespread ratification of the ICC 
Statute on the continent and, to a lesser extent, incorporation of ICC 
crimes into national legislation.
47
 We have also witnessed the development 
of mechanisms to bring perpetrators to justice such as the Gacaca trials in 
Rwanda,
48
 mobile courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo
49
 and 
special war crimes chambers in Uganda.
50
 Indeed, to the extent that 
Nuremberg was as much about accountability as prosecution, and about 
creating a record so victims can know the truth and perpetrators cannot 
engage in denial, all these different modalities are part of the Nuremberg 
legacy.  
In Asia, although ICC ratification rates are relatively low, a new 
volume by Kirsten Sellars, entitled Trials for International Crimes in Asia, 
observes that although Asian states may be more likely to view 
international trials with skepticism, they have often conducted national 
trials. She points to the in absentia trial of Pol Pot in Cambodia as one 
example, suggesting that if it was “the unsound sequel to the Eichmann 
 
 
 44. Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal 
Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Bodies, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013).  
 45. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 
2012 I.C.J. 422 (July 20). 
 46. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
 47. Canada, for example, adopted the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, 
c. 24, to implement the ICC Statute, and France amended its legislation dealing with crimes against 
humanity (Loi 64-1326 du 26 Décembre 1964 tendant à constater l’imprescriptibilité des crimes contre 
l’humanité [Law 64-1326 of December 26, 1964 on Crimes Against Humanity], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 29, 1964, p. 11788, originally 
passed based on the Nuremberg Principles after ratification of the Rome Statute.). 
 48. See William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and the Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
879, 891–94 (2005) (discussing the history and importance of the Gacaca trials). 
 49. Compare William E. Davis & Helga Turku, Access to Justice and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 47, 57–58 (2012) (discussing the effectiveness of the mobile courts) 
with Jacob N. Foster, A Situational Approach to Prosecutorial Strategy at the International Criminal 
Court, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 439, 470–71 (2016) (discussing the practical deficiencies of the mobile 
courts). 
 50. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS CRIMES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS: 
UGANDA’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMES DIVISION (2012) (giving an overview of the International Crimes 
Division and providing recommendations for improvement). 
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trial, it was also the overlooked prequel to the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia.”51 The book includes chapters on the influence of 
the Tokyo trials in modern international criminal law, the Bangladesh 
experience, Indian and Indonesian proceedings, and the Special Panels for 
East Timor.  
III. CHALLENGES TO THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 
So with all this ferment of activity at both the national and international 
levels, is the Nuremberg legacy under threat today? There are two sets of 
concerns in this regard. The first is the “unfinished” business of 
Nuremberg itself; the second is challenges to the legacy by States.  
A. The Unfinished Work of Nuremberg 
In spite of the considerable achievements listed above, which are just a 
sample of the Nuremberg Charter’s influence upon our modern world, 
there is work remaining to be done. The first task is to truly universalize 
the legacy and the message of Nuremberg, so it is no longer an 
“American” or a “Western” show. This conference is a wonderful example 
of that.
52
  
The second task is to complete the normative framework of the Charter 
and enhance the effectiveness of the institutions charged with its 
application. This means continuing to press for universal ratification of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Three permanent 
members of the UN Security Council still have not ratified the Statute—
China, Russia and the United States—and dozens of small and large States 
still remain outside the Rome Statute system. This undermines the Court’s 
legitimacy, and makes its work more difficult.  
In terms of the substantive law of the Charter, the laws of war are 
widely codified, but there remain gaps, and there is a continuing need for 
vigilance. Many States are developing restrictive definitions of 
proportionality to justify attacks that kill large numbers of civilians or 
target civilian objects, broadening the notion of “combatants” to expand 
the range of permitted lethal targeting and developing dangerous new 
 
 
 51. Kirsten Sellars, Introduction, in TRIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN ASIA 1, 18 (Kirsten 
Sellars ed., 2015). 
 52. Workshops and panels at this conference include Promotion of Human Rights and 
International Criminal Law by International and Regional Courts and Complementarity and 
Cooperation, as well as sessions examining the universality of the Nuremberg Principles from both an 
Islamic and African perspective.  
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weapons systems. Nuclear weapons, in particular, remain a constant threat 
not only to our safety, but to humanity’s survival. The rules relating to 
non-international armed conflict are less well developed than the rules on 
international armed conflict, and the so-called “global war on terror” has 
undermined the consistent meaning and application of international 
humanitarian law, a point to which I will return presently. 
Regarding the crime of aggression, progress has been made but many 
questions remain. There are now a sufficient number of ratifications of the 
Kampala amendments to activate the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression in 2017, meaning that the Assembly of States Parties may vote 
upon the amendments’ entry into force. Hopefully States already party to 
the Rome Statute will not try to opt out of the aggression amendments at 
that time en masse. It is troubling that when the Kampala amendments 
were adopted, “understandings” were attached that were regressive, 
providing, among other things, that there is no duty or right of States to 
exercise their domestic jurisdiction with respect to acts of aggression 
committed by other States.
53
 Although the understandings are presumably 
non-binding as a formal matter of international law, their clear intent is to 
ensure that aggression, unlike other jus cogens crimes, will not be 
governed by the same regime that governs other universal jurisdiction 
crimes. Thus, avoiding the possibility of there one day being a “Pinochet 
moment” for the crime of aggression.  
Finally, with respect to crimes against humanity, it is stunning that in a 
world with more than 300 international criminal law conventions, 
covering everything from the cutting of submarine cables to terrorist 
bombings and genocide, one of the three “core” crimes of the Nuremberg 
trials does not yet have its own treaty.
54
 Belgium v. Senegal and the 
Pinochet case clearly demonstrated how important a treaty basis for 
jurisdiction can be in international law.
55
 Likewise, the absence of a crimes 
against humanity convention created difficulties for the International 
Court of Justice in Bosnia v. Serbia.
56
 It is thus good news that the 
International Law Commission has taken up the Initiative of the Whitney 
 
 
 53. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Res RC/RES.6, Annex III (June 11, 2010). 
 54. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 457 (1994).  
 55. See Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) Judgement, 
supra note 45, ¶¶ 42–63; R. v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, 
Ex Parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); 
 56. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 277 (Feb. 26). 
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R. Harris World Law Institute
57
 and begun the drafting of a new 
international convention on crimes against humanity under the able 
leadership of Special Rapporteur Sean Murphy who has been elected by 
the Commission to lead this project.
58
 
B. The Noncompliance of States  
As Antonio Cassese wrote more than a decade ago, international 
terrorism is disrupting some important legal categories.
59
 Recall that when 
the ICC project was reintroduced to the General Assembly’s agenda in 
1989, it was by Trinidad and Tobago, leading a group of Caribbean States, 
which argued that the future international criminal court should address 
the crimes of terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
60
 Terrorism was the 
subject of an international court convention in 1937 that never entered into 
force.
61
 Terrorism not only harms victims of terrorist acts, but provokes 
States to launch terrible wars in response to terrorist violence. It is 
increasingly difficult to understand how terrorism is not one of “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” like 
other ICC crimes. When the Rome Statute was adopted without the crime 
of terrorism included, a Resolution was appended to the Conference’s 
Final Act promising to take up the issue in the future.
62
 Each year at the 
annual meeting of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties, some States have 
tried to convince ICC States Parties to take terrorism seriously.
63
 It is, it 
seems, the scourge of our time, as the recent tragedies of Paris, Beirut, 
 
 
 57. The Initiative has proposed a model convention on crimes against humanity. See FORGING A 
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011). 
 58. See Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity, First Rep. on Crimes Against 
Humanity, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680 (Feb. 17, 2015) (by Sean D. Murphy); Special 
Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity, Second Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, International 
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/690 (Jan. 21, 2016) (by Sean D. Murphy). 
 59. Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of 
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2001). 
 60. Sadat, supra note 32, at 683 n.112. 
 61. The draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court is reproduced at 
U.N. Secretary-General, Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction 
(Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General), Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.1, 
Appendix 8 (1949). 
 62. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 
(Vol. I), Annex 1, Resolution E (Aug. 2002). 
 63. See, e.g., Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Eighth Session, The Hague, November 18–26, 2009, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20, Appendix III at 65-6 
(2009) (formal proposal of the Netherlands to include terrorism within the ICC’s jurisdiction at the 
Kampala Review Conference). 
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Baghdad, Istanbul, and Brussels demonstrate. Perhaps those States arguing 
for the inclusion of this crime in the ICC Statute—or for the creation of 
other international mechanisms to try terrorists—are correct. Certainly, the 
gaps in the current legal regime are unsatisfactory.  
Particularly since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Nuremberg 
principles have been undermined by the policies of the very nations that 
gave them birth, including my own country. Recall Jackson’s exultation in 
his opening address: “[t]hat four great nations, flushed with victory and 
stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their 
captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant 
tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”64 
When the United States was stung by the terrible attacks of September 
11, 2001, reason was jettisoned as vengeance and even cruelty took its 
place. Lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice argued that the United 
States should abandon the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
in favor of a new legal regime for the detention, treatment and trial of 
enemy prisoners, whether captured in the United States or abroad.
65
 Then 
Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales, famously opined that portions 
of the Conventions were “quaint” and “obsolete,”66 ultimately persuading 
the President to deny the applicability of Geneva law to either al-Qaeda or 
Taliban detainees in U.S. custody. A diplomatic and legal furor ensued, 
particularly after the transfer of prisoners from Afghanistan to 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they were kept in deplorable conditions.
67
 
The Afghanistan war was at least buttressed, if not authorized, by the 
Security Council; important Resolutions were adopted, including 
Resolution 1373,
68
 that reinforce the Nuremberg paradigm by emphasizing 
 
 
 64. Jackson, Opening Statement, supra note 4, at 99. 
 65. Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to William R. Haynes II, General Counsel of U.S. Dep’t of Defense on the Application of 
Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://nsarchive.gwu. 
edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020109.pdf (arguing that the Geneva Conventions do not apply 
to the detention and trial by military commission of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners); Memorandum 
from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President & William R. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense (Jan. 22, 
2002), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/ legacy/2009/08/24/memo-laws-
taliban-detainees.pdf (signing off on Yoo’s memo of January 9th and sending it on to the Pentagon). 
These memos, along with others, are colloquially referred to as “the Torture Memos.” 
 66. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales. Counsel to the President, to President George W. 
Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf. 
 67. In a 2005 report, for example, Amnesty International declared that Guantanamo Bay “has 
become the gulag of our times.” Irene Khan, Foreword to Amnesty International Report 2005 i (2005). 
See also Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under 
International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 311–12 (2006); Sadat, supra note 31, at 67. 
 68. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  
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the duty of States to try or extradite suspected international criminals. But 
it was followed by the 2003 invasion of Iraq in which two of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council appeared to contravene the 
prohibition of Article 2(4).
69
 Moreover, the Iraq invasion and war in 
Afghanistan were accompanied by high levels of civilian casualties
70
 and, 
as reported by the press and in Congressional hearings, the apparent 
adoption of torture and cruel treatment as official U.S. policy, in violation 
of international conventional and customary law.
71
 More recently, the 
United States has engaged in targeted killing by remotely piloted 
unmanned vehicles in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and 
Somalia, campaigns which often involve high civilian casualties, mistakes, 
and the terrorization of civilians in the areas in which the drones are 
operating.
72
 
To be sure, the United States is not the only member of the Security 
Council using its power to avoid being contained by the international legal 
system. Moreover, the above mentioned actions are not of the same 
magnitude as the crimes committed during World War II. But they are 
nevertheless shocking, precisely because they have been undertaken by the 
United States, a country that endeavors to distinguish itself by its high 
moral standards, sees itself as a champion of the rule of law, and leant its 
considerable strength to ensuring the success of the Nuremberg trials and 
building the post-war system of international peace and security. The 
United Kingdom joined the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and Russia and China 
have vetoed important resolutions on Syria that would have come closer to 
imposing real consequences for the violence as well as referring the 
situation to the International Criminal Court.
73
 There is a movement to 
impose a “responsibility not to veto” on the five permanent members of 
 
 
 69. See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO L.J. 173 (2004); Ewan 
MacAskill & Julian Borger, Iraq War was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan, GUARDIAN 
(D.C.), Sept. 15, 2004, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq.  
 70. The Iraq Body Count estimates that more than 6,000 civilians died in the first phase of the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alone, and that more than 160,000 civilian deaths have been documented 
following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. See https://www.iraqbodycount.org/; see also JOHN HAGAN ET 
AL., IRAQ AND THE CRIMES OF AGGRESSIVE WAR 1 (2015). 
 71. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rep. No. 113-288 (2014), available at 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf. 
 72. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, America’s Drone Wars, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215 
(2012). 
 73. Leila Nadya Sadat, Genocide in Syria: International Legal Options, International Legal 
Limits, and the Serious Problem of Political Will, 5 IMPUNITY WATCH L.J. 1, 9 (2015), available 
at http://impunitywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Sadat-IW-FINAL.pdf.  
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the Security Council;
74
 but it is not clear whether that initiative will bear 
fruit. Meanwhile, more than 400,000 Syrians have lost their lives, millions 
have been displaced, and Russia has apparently annexed parts of Ukraine. 
The Paris attacks of November 2015 were discussed in the Security 
Council,
75
 but there has not been a concerted effort to make a legal as 
opposed to a policy argument for military action in Syria in response.
76 
 
Given this record of noncompliance and disrespect for the Nuremberg 
principles by the great powers, it is perhaps unsurprising that we find other 
States following suit. The African Union proposal two years ago to create 
a new African Court of Justice and Human Rights that would provide 
heads of state with immunity from prosecution is just one example,
77
 as is 
the recently announced withdrawal of two African States from the Court. 
Other countries are retreating from the exercise of universal jurisdiction, 
even in Pinochet-type cases.
78
 These are worrisome trends.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude by restating the obvious: The record of compliance 
with the Nuremberg principles is mixed. At the same time, the Nuremberg 
legacy itself is extraordinary, and its importance is hard to overstate. On 
the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the trials, I want to conclude on a 
cautiously optimistic note. We come to meetings like this neither to 
unthinkingly engage in self-adulation nor to wallow in destructive self-
criticism. Rather, our job is to help make international criminal justice 
stronger, fairer, more effective, and more respected. This brings me to 
three final points. 
 
 
 74. See, e.g., Letter dated Dec. 14, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to 
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/70/621 (Dec. 14, 
2015). 
 75. See S.C. Res. 2249, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2249 (Nov. 20, 2015); S.C. Press Release, Security 
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Paris, U.N. Doc. SC/12121 (Nov. 13, 2015).  
  76. Although the United States has communicated its position to the United Nations Security 
Council stating “in accordance with the UN Charter and its recognition of the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense,” the US would use ”necessary and proportionate military 
action” in Syria. S.C. Res. 2249, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2249 (Nov. 20, 2015), this legal position has not 
been forthcoming in debates at the Council, and has been criticized as overly vague. 
 77. Executive Council of the African Union, The Report, The Draft Legal Instruments and 
Recommendations of the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, ¶¶ 24–27, 
Doc. EX.CL/846(XXV) (June 2014). 
 78. See LUC REYDAMS, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE APPLICATION OF UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY (Trans European Policy Studies Ass’n ed., 2016), 
available at http://statewatch.org/news/2016/apr/ep-study-universal-jurisdiction-fight-against-impunity-4-
16.pdf (examining the reasons behind this retreat and highlighting overreaches of the principle in 
several European countries). 
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First, Nuremberg and the international community’s experience with 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals demonstrate that international 
justice doesn’t have to be perfect to be good. Holding up Nuremberg to an 
impossible, imagined standard is neither fair nor productive. The same is 
true for the International Criminal Court. Jackson himself argued that he 
was not asking the Tribunal to make the commission of war impossible, 
but to put international law and its precepts squarely “on the side of 
peace.”79 
Second, as aforementioned, international criminal trials are not the only 
way to ensure accountability for the commission of international crimes—
they are not the only tools available. There are many ways to enforce 
international humanitarian law and the Nuremberg principles. These 
include human rights courts, national courts, truth commissions, the 
International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, fact 
finding commissions of inquiry, UN human rights bodies, national civil 
lawsuits, and ad hoc and mixed model international criminal tribunals. I 
am sure there are others which I have not mentioned, or do not exist yet 
but are to be established. To enhance the effectiveness of the Nuremberg 
principles, we need to broaden our thinking, get creative and draw from 
the rich talent present all over the globe to improve the international 
criminal justice system. And we will, I daresay, do even better than they 
did in 1945 because we can tap into an additional fifty percent of this 
international talent that is female, something that was apparently 
overlooked at Nuremberg. 
Finally, we cannot forget that the Nuremberg trials and, fifty years 
later, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, were nothing 
short of miracles, neither of which was expected or foreseen by many 
knowledgeable observers at the time. Today is a day to celebrate those 
extraordinary events and honor the memories of the trailblazing 
individuals who came before us. It seems only proper to remember our 
dear friend and colleague, the late Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, who was firmly 
committed to the Nuremberg principles and felt that the trials were “an 
historic must.” In his lecture to this Academy in 2012, he wrote that he felt 
that “dramatic encounters here in Nuremberg, this shocking look into the 
mirror of the Nazi crimes—it was necessary for the German people, as 
some kind of catharsis.”80  
 
 
 79. Jackson Opening Statement, supra note 4, at 155. 
 80.  Hans-Peter Kaul, The Nuremberg Legacy and the International Criminal Court—Lecture in 
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Likewise, I would also like to evoke the memory of former Nuremberg 
Prosecutor Whitney Harris, who wrote in 1999:  
Nuremberg in 1946, and Rome in 1998, stood fast against the 
pressures of the precedents of the past. Nuremberg refused to apply 
executive punishment against its vanquished enemies, according 
them the rights of accused persons under the law. Rome rules that 
every person is subject to the law. 
. . . .  
Nuremberg and Rome stand against the resignation of humankind to 
its self-debasement and its self-destruction. The achievements of 
that great trial and historic conference in elevating justice and law 
over inhumanity and war give promise for a better tomorrow.
81
 
Friends and colleagues, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it has 
been an extraordinary opportunity for me to make the pilgrimage to this 
place, to engage in this conversation, to participate in your debates. I am 
sure that our meetings and exchanges over the next two days will be rich 
and fruitful, and I remain deeply honored to have been invited to address 
such a distinguished and accomplished group.  
Thank you so much for your kind attention. 
 
 
 81. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 593. 
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